



SEMANTIC OPPOSITION AND LEXICAL MEANING: EPISTEMOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT

Semantic opposition is more than a lexical device; it is a fundamental epistemological strategy by which human beings differentiate, categorize, and structure knowledge. This paper explores how oppositional structures in language—such as binary antonyms (true/false, light/dark), scalar contrasts (hot/cold), and conceptual reversals (buy/sell)—function as cognitive tools for learning and conceptualizing the world. Drawing on the philosophical foundations of contrast in Western thought, particularly the ontological dualisms articulated by Plato and formalized in modern structural linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure, the study demonstrates that linguistic meaning arises not from isolated reference but from systematic difference.

Through the lens of epistemology, the paper examines how opposition enables semantic differentiation in first-language acquisition, how structuralist linguists such as Jakobson and Trier identified contrast as central to the lexicon, and how cognitive linguists expanded this view by integrating image schemas and conceptual polarity. Cross-cultural examples from Russian and Uzbek reveal that while opposition is universal in form, its semantic content is culturally mediated, influencing how speakers classify emotions, ethics, and space.

By analyzing the interplay between ontology, cognition, and lexical contrast, the study argues that semantic opposition constitutes a core infrastructure of epistemic activity, allowing language to function not merely as a mirror of reality, but as a tool for constructing and organizing knowledge. The findings have implications for linguistic theory, cognitive science, cross-cultural semantics, and the philosophy of language.

1. Introduction: Language, Opposition, and Knowing

How do human beings come to know the world? One answer, grounded in both linguistic and epistemological traditions, is: through distinction. The process of learning and knowing relies not simply on accumulating facts, but on the ability to recognize and impose boundaries—between light and dark, self and other, true and false, possible and impossible. This tendency to structure knowledge through contrast is deeply embedded in language itself. From the earliest stages of development, humans acquire concepts by recognizing what something is not, just as

much as what it is. Language provides the infrastructure for this operation through a fundamental mechanism: semantic opposition.

Semantic oppositions are not merely lexical pairs such as *hot/cold* or *right/wrong*; they are expressions of an underlying cognitive and ontological structure that allows us to classify, differentiate, and understand the world. As Ferdinand de Saussure famously argued, linguistic signs gain value not through their inherent properties, but through their relations of difference within a system.¹ In this way, opposition is not just one semantic relation among many; it is constitutive of meaning itself. It is through oppositional structures that meaning becomes knowable, concepts are stabilized, and worldviews are shaped.

In epistemological terms, opposition serves as a heuristic device—a way of simplifying complex realities into comprehensible terms. When we learn new words or ideas, we often rely on opposites: to define “justice,” we contrast it with “injustice”; to understand “freedom,” we explore its negation or limitation. This process is evident not only in philosophical discourse but in everyday language learning and cross-linguistic conceptualization.

This paper investigates semantic opposition as a cognitive-linguistic bridge between language and knowledge. It begins by tracing the ontological basis of opposition in classical and modern thought, then explores how opposition functions epistemologically in language acquisition and conceptual differentiation. From there, it considers structuralist theories of opposition, especially those of Saussure, Jakobson, and Trier, which see contrast as central to the architecture of meaning. The study then examines cognitive linguistic perspectives, including conceptual metaphor and prototype theory, to show how opposition operates in embodied thought and categorization.

Crucially, the paper also considers how oppositions vary cross-culturally. In English, moral oppositions such as *good/evil* or emotional ones like *happy/sad* dominate certain domains; in Uzbek, pairs like *halol/harom* reflect religious and ethical systems specific to the cultural context. These comparisons underscore the fact that while the structure of opposition may be linguistically universal, its semantic content is often culturally specific, shaping the epistemic landscapes of speakers differently.

The central argument advanced here is that semantic opposition is not a surface-level feature of language, but a foundational principle of epistemology. By encoding contrast into our words and categories, language does not merely describe the world—it actively shapes what can be known, how it can be known, and what distinctions become meaningful in a given linguistic community.

2. Ontological Grounding of Opposition

To understand the epistemological power of semantic opposition, one must first consider its ontological grounding. Opposition is not simply a way of speaking—it is a way of *being*. Long before opposition served linguistic or pedagogical functions, it was recognized as a structuring principle of reality itself. Classical philosophy, especially in the Western tradition, emphasized the dual nature of existence: light and darkness, being and non-being, motion and rest. These polarities were seen not as accidental contrasts but as essential to the fabric of the cosmos.

In Plato’s metaphysics, for example, the realm of Forms is accessible through dialectical reasoning, which proceeds by testing concepts against their opposites—truth against falsity,

¹ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. Roy Harris (Chicago: Open Court, 1983), 117.

justice against injustice.² This dialectical movement is not merely rhetorical but ontological: knowledge emerges when the soul moves from the illusion of appearances to the truth of ideal opposites. Aristotle, though more empirical, similarly placed contrast at the heart of classification. His categories—such as substance, quantity, quality, relation—are defined by setting boundaries between what a thing *is* and what it *is not*.³

This ontological logic extends into language. When Ferdinand de Saussure proposed that the linguistic sign gains value not in isolation but through its difference from other signs, he was building on a much older philosophical intuition: that identity is determined through opposition.⁴ In Saussure's system, language is not a collection of names for things; it is a dynamic structure of differential relations. A word like *white* does not gain meaning because of some intrinsic tie to a referent, but because it is not *black*, *grey*, or *red*. Language, in this view, encodes not absolute essences but relational contrasts—the same contrasts that govern our metaphysical understanding of being.

Modern semiotics continues this line of thought. Structuralist theorists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss argued that binary opposition is the elementary form of human classification, especially in myth, kinship systems, and moral codes.⁵ For Lévi-Strauss, the human mind universally seeks to organize the world through opposing pairs, because contrast provides cognitive stability: it defines the limits of categories and the rules of inclusion and exclusion.

Even outside the structuralist paradigm, contemporary philosophers such as Ernst Cassirer emphasize the symbolic construction of reality. In Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms, language is not a passive mirror of the world but a means by which the human subject imposes form and opposition upon chaos.⁶ To name is to distinguish, and to distinguish is to posit boundaries—which are inherently oppositional acts.

Thus, semantic opposition has ontological depth. It reflects the way human beings experience the world as structured by limits, contrasts, and boundaries. These boundaries are not merely linguistic conveniences; they are epistemic necessities rooted in the ontological architecture of both thought and reality.

3. Semantic Opposition as a Tool for Epistemic Differentiation

Having established the ontological roots of opposition, we now turn to its epistemological function—how it enables the acquisition and differentiation of knowledge. In language, opposition is not merely a structural phenomenon; it is a cognitive device by which humans carve meaningful distinctions out of the undifferentiated flux of experience. From early childhood to philosophical inquiry, we come to know the world not by absorbing isolated facts, but by contrasting what something *is* against what it *is not*.

3.1. First Language Acquisition and Semantic Contrast

One of the earliest and most robustly studied manifestations of this epistemic process is in first language acquisition. Developmental psycholinguists such as Eve V. Clark have shown

² Plato, *Republic*, trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992), esp. Book VI–VII.

³ Aristotle, *Categories*, trans. J. L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 1a20–1b10.

⁴ Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 114–117.

⁵ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, trans. George Weidenfeld (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 132–145.

⁶ Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 1: *Language*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 80–97.

that children do not learn words in isolation, but often through contrastive mapping—by noticing that one word is used where another is not.⁷ A child learns the meaning of *tall* in opposition to *short*, or *wet* in opposition to *dry*. These contrasts are particularly salient in adjective pairs, where the distinction is perceptible and often reinforced by environmental cues and adult speech. In fact, Clark's "principle of contrast" states that every new word is assumed to mark a meaning difference, and children use contrast to eliminate semantic overlap.⁸

Moreover, contrast-based acquisition extends beyond individual words. In Vygotsky's sociocultural theory of language development, the child internalizes not only labels but the categorical oppositions used by adults in their speech acts—*good/bad*, *mine/yours*, *now/later*—each of which imposes epistemic structure on experience.⁹ This supports the view that opposition is a primary cognitive organizer of reality, acquired and refined through language use.

3.2. Differentiation and Category Formation

Opposition also plays a central role in concept formation, a core concern in epistemology. Concepts are mental representations of categories, and their clarity depends on the boundaries we draw—boundaries that are often learned through contrast. As Eleanor Rosch's prototype theory demonstrates, categories are not defined by rigid criteria, but by graded membership around a central example.¹⁰ However, knowing what a concept *is* still depends on knowing what lies outside it. The prototypical *bird* (e.g., a robin) gains meaning partly through comparison with less typical members (e.g., ostrich, penguin), and against non-birds (e.g., bats or airplanes). Semantic opposition here functions not as binary logic but as graded contrast, guiding epistemic differentiation.

Contrast also helps distinguish related concepts. For instance, in English, the trio *freedom*, *liberty*, and *independence* occupy overlapping semantic fields. Yet speakers often use subtle oppositional distinctions to disambiguate them: *freedom* may connote personal lack of restraint, *liberty* may suggest legal or civic status, and *independence* may refer to self-reliance. These semantic nuances emerge from oppositional framing, shaped by context, usage, and cultural convention.

3.3. Opposition Beyond the Lexeme: Discourse and Logic

The epistemic role of opposition extends from individual words to broader discursive structures. In scientific, philosophical, and everyday reasoning, contrastive thinking enables clarification, argumentation, and revision of beliefs. As noted by Charles S. Peirce in his pragmatic maxim, the meaning of a concept lies in its practical consequences—often best revealed by considering its opposite or negation.¹¹ What would happen if a theory were *not* true? What distinguishes this idea from another, seemingly similar one?

This process is formalized in binary logic, where oppositions like *true/false*, *necessary/contingent*, and *possible/impossible* form the very foundation of valid inference. While natural languages are more flexible than formal logics, they retain contrastive structures such as concessive clauses (*although*, *but*, *on the contrary*), which reflect epistemic maneuvering

⁷ Eve V. Clark, *First Language Acquisition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 226–235.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 246–248.

⁹ Lev S. Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, trans. Alex Kozulin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 91–98.

¹⁰ Eleanor Rosch, "Principles of Categorization," in *Cognition and Categorization*, eds. E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978), 27–48.

¹¹ Charles S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," *Popular Science Monthly* 12 (1878): 286–302.

in real-time communication. Such structures guide interlocutors through semantic negotiation, enabling the co-construction of knowledge by emphasizing what *is not*, in order to clarify what *is*.

Furthermore, in philosophical epistemology, especially in the analytic tradition, knowledge is often refined through counterexample and contrast. To know what “justice” is, Plato's Socrates asks what it is *not*—testing definitions by proposing their opposites. This dialectical technique is epistemologically powerful because it uses semantic negation as a filter, weeding out insufficient or misleading formulations.

Semantic opposition, then, is not merely a feature of word pairs—it is a cognitive strategy embedded in language and used across multiple levels: lexical, conceptual, discursive, and logical. It allows us to segment the world into categories, refine concepts, and detect meaningful distinctions. In doing so, it reveals itself as an indispensable tool of epistemic differentiation.

4. Linguistic Structures of Contrast

The idea that language encodes knowledge through opposition is given structural form in the architecture of the lexicon. As Saussure emphasized, linguistic signs do not have meaning by reference to an object or concept in isolation, but rather acquire value through their differences from other signs within a system.¹² This insight, though often cited as a foundational principle of structuralism, has deep epistemological consequences: it suggests that language does not passively reflect reality but actively structures it through contrast. In this view, opposition is not merely a lexical phenomenon but a principle of semantic organization—a framework that enables speakers to classify and differentiate experience.

This relational view of meaning is evident at every level of linguistic structure. In phonology, contrast determines phonemic identity (e.g., /p/ vs. /b/ differs only in voicing), while in the lexicon, oppositions like *hot/cold*, *buy/sell*, or *alive/dead* serve to delimit semantic boundaries. Roman Jakobson extended this logic by analyzing not only phonological but semantic oppositions in terms of binary features, noting that languages often mark one pole of a contrast as the default or unmarked form, while the other is marked and semantically specialized.¹³ For instance, *alive* functions as the unmarked term relative to *dead*, and *big* is more neutral than *small*, reflecting how language encodes asymmetries in conceptual salience.

These oppositions, however, are not fixed dichotomies; they are part of more fluid systems. Jost Trier's theory of semantic fields provides a dynamic account of how words are situated within contrastive networks.¹⁴ In his view, each lexeme occupies a position defined by its relation to others in a bounded field—such as the color spectrum or the vocabulary of emotions. A word like *blue*, for example, gains meaning not by referencing a fixed wavelength, but by being neither green nor purple, just as *anger* is understood in its semantic space between *annoyance* and *rage*. In such systems, opposition is not binary but scalar, allowing for fine gradations of meaning and epistemic precision.

This structural organization is not limited to content words. Function words and grammatical structures also reflect contrastive logic. Concessive constructions (*although*, *but*,

¹² Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. Roy Harris (Chicago: Open Court, 1983), 114–117.

¹³ Roman Jakobson, “Linguistic Aspects of Translation,” in *Selected Writings*, vol. 2 (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 260–266.

¹⁴ Jost Trier, “Das sprachliche Feld,” *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 7 (1931): 428–449.

even though) explicitly signal contrast, guiding the listener through shifts in perspective or expectation. These linguistic mechanisms mirror cognitive strategies: to assert something is to distinguish it from its alternative, to define is to exclude, to know is to contrast. Whether in discourse, morphology, or syntax, the principle of opposition permeates the language system as a cognitive strategy for managing distinctions.

Importantly, languages also encode opposition through typologically diverse semantic relations, each reflecting a different kind of epistemic contrast. Antonyms such as *wide/narrow* are typically gradable and context-sensitive, whereas complementary pairs like *dead/alive* are absolute and mutually exclusive. Converses, such as *buy/sell* or *teacher/student*, define the same event from opposing relational perspectives, while reversives (*open/close*, *enter/exit*) represent actions that undo or reverse one another.¹⁵ Each type reflects a different logical and conceptual relation, revealing the nuanced ways in which opposition operates in human cognition and language.

The epistemological import of these distinctions becomes clearer when we recognize that such lexical oppositions shape how knowledge is organized and communicated. In legal and ethical discourse, for example, the opposition between *legal/illegal* or *guilty/innocent* is not merely descriptive but constitutive of conceptual understanding. The clarity of such oppositions enables the classification of behaviors, the framing of judgments, and the navigation of moral and institutional systems.

Moreover, the structure of opposition itself is not neutral. As Jakobson observed, the presence of markedness in binary pairs introduces directionality in interpretation: the unmarked term often serves as the epistemic default, while the marked term calls attention to deviation or specificity.² This asymmetry mirrors broader cultural and cognitive biases, embedding value judgments or normativity within linguistic structure. For instance, in English, *white/black*, *able/disabled*, or *normal/abnormal* reflect not only semantic opposition but also cultural hierarchies of meaning.

Thus, the lexicon is not a flat list of word-referent pairs, but a relational matrix grounded in opposition. Through contrast, languages carve out conceptual space, guide inference, and facilitate precision. Structuralist theories revealed that these oppositional relations are systemic and generative, while later typologies have shown their diversity and depth. What emerges is a view of opposition not merely as a linguistic artifact, but as a cognitive and epistemic scaffolding, embedded in the very logic of how meaning is structured and accessed.

5. Cognitive and Cultural Dimensions of Opposition

While structuralist models of semantic opposition reveal the formal logic by which contrast organizes the lexicon, they do not fully account for how these contrasts emerge from embodied cognition or how they vary across cultures. Contemporary research in cognitive linguistics and linguistic anthropology shows that opposition is not a purely linguistic construct—it is shaped by how humans experience the world physically, conceptually, and socially. Opposition is thus not only a structural principle but a cognitive and cultural tool, central to how we learn, reason, and interpret meaning.

The foundations of this embodied view are found in the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who argue that basic oppositional metaphors—*up/down*, *in/out*, *light/dark*—are

¹⁵ D. Alan Cruse, *Lexical Semantics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 197–214.

grounded in sensorimotor experience.¹⁶ For instance, we associate goodness with upwardness (“in high spirits,” “moral high ground”) and badness with downwardness (“feeling low,” “fall from grace”). These oppositional schemas are not arbitrary linguistic habits; they reflect deep cognitive patterns that emerge from bodily orientation and perception. As such, semantic oppositions are not merely symbolic—they are rooted in physical experience, and language becomes the medium through which these embodied contrasts are expressed and systematized.

This embodiment is visible in concept formation across semantic domains. Emotions, for example, are frequently organized along oppositional axes: *happy/sad*, *fear/courage*, *love/hate*. These contrasts often extend metaphorically into spatial, color, and temperature domains. In many languages, *anger* is associated with heat and *calmness* with coolness; *joy* is associated with brightness, *sorrow* with darkness. These metaphors are not coincidental; they reflect the cross-modal mapping of experience into language.¹⁷ Semantic opposition thus enables the projection of cognitive structure onto abstract domains, turning raw sensation into knowable categories.

However, the content and salience of oppositions vary significantly across cultures, revealing that while the form of contrast is universal, its meaning is culturally constructed. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, especially in its “weak” or “interpretive” form, posits that linguistic structures influence habitual thought patterns.¹⁸ From this perspective, the oppositions a language encodes may shape not only expression but also cognitive salience and epistemic framing.

For example, in Russian, the basic color term *goluboy* (light blue) is lexically distinct from *sinij* (dark blue), whereas English covers both with “blue.” Research has shown that Russian speakers are faster at distinguishing shades of blue that cross this lexical boundary, suggesting that language-specific opposition influences perceptual discrimination.¹⁹ In this case, the semantic contrast built into the lexicon sharpens the perceptual and cognitive boundary between categories.

In Uzbek, religious and ethical oppositions such as *halol/harom* (permitted/forbidden) or *toza/iflos* (clean/impure) are not just lexical contrasts—they are ideologically loaded binaries that shape social behavior and identity. These oppositions operate not merely as descriptions but as normative judgments, embedded in cultural scripts and reinforced through ritual, law, and education. When a speaker labels an act as *harom*, they are not simply categorizing it semantically—they are locating it within a culturally specific moral epistemology. In this way, opposition becomes a tool for social regulation, reflecting collective values and taboos.

Moreover, cultures may privilege different kinds of opposition. Western philosophical traditions have often favored binary logic and exclusionary pairs (*true/false*, *just/unjust*, *subject/object*), whereas many Eastern and Indigenous systems embrace complementary dualities. The Chinese *yin/yang* model, for example, represents opposites as interdependent and cyclical, rather than mutually exclusive.²⁰ This model structures not only cosmology but

¹⁶ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 14–21.

¹⁷ Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 22–45.

¹⁸ Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality*, ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956), 212–214.

¹⁹ Jonathan Winawer et al., “Russian Blues Reveal Effects of Language on Color Discrimination,” *PNAS* 104, no. 19 (2007): 7780–7785.

²⁰ Chad Hansen, *A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 57–59.

also language and cognition, allowing speakers to perceive continuity within contrast, and emphasizing relationality over separation.

This variation challenges the assumption that all semantic oppositions reflect universal categories. Rather, they reveal how languages act as filters, emphasizing certain distinctions while obscuring others. Language does not merely name what is already known; it participates in shaping what is knowable and salient within a culture. The oppositions a language encodes reflect its speakers' ontological assumptions, their cognitive habits, and the epistemic frameworks through which they interpret reality.

In sum, semantic opposition is cognitively grounded and culturally patterned. It begins in embodied experience, is systematized in linguistic structures, and is refracted through cultural worldviews. As such, it plays a dual role: it reflects human perception, and it constructs conceptual boundaries. Language, by encoding oppositional contrast, enables not just the naming of things, but the structuring of knowledge itself—across minds, across cultures.

6. Conclusion: Semantic Opposition as Epistemic Infrastructure

Throughout this paper, we have traced how semantic opposition functions as a foundational mechanism for organizing knowledge. Far from being a mere feature of lexical structure, opposition operates at the intersection of ontology, cognition, culture, and language, allowing human beings to distinguish, classify, and interpret the world around them. From early developmental stages to sophisticated philosophical reflection, opposition serves as a cognitive strategy for differentiating concepts, a linguistic structure for encoding contrasts, and a cultural tool for articulating values and norms.

Ontologically, opposition reflects the structuring of being itself—humans experience the world through contrasts such as presence and absence, light and dark, self and other. Epistemologically, this contrastive logic enables knowledge by delimiting the boundaries of concepts; we understand what a thing is partly by understanding what it is not. Structuralist linguistics formalized this insight by showing that meaning arises relationally, through difference, not through isolated reference. Cognitive linguistics then enriched this view by grounding opposition in embodied experience and showing how metaphor, prototype, and categorization all rely on contrastive dimensions.

Moreover, cross-cultural analysis reveals that while the form of opposition is universal, its semantic content and epistemic significance are culturally contingent. Languages encode different kinds of oppositions, highlight different contrasts, and attach different values to marked and unmarked terms. Whether in Russian color terms, Uzbek moral binaries, or Daoist cosmological dualities, opposition reflects not only how people speak, but how they perceive, evaluate, and know.

In light of this, semantic opposition should be understood not as a peripheral linguistic feature but as part of the epistemic infrastructure of language—a system that enables knowledge by imposing order through contrast. It shapes what is conceptually available, what is cognitively salient, and what is culturally significant. As linguistic theory, cognitive science, and epistemology continue to converge, opposition emerges not merely as a property of the lexicon, but as a principle of thought itself.

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